log -Round Game-Theoretically-Fair Leader Election

Ilan Komargodski*, Shin’ichiro Matsuo, Elaine Shi, Ke Wu

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

It is well-known that in the presence of majority coalitions, strongly fair coin toss is impossible. A line of recent works have shown that by relaxing the fairness notion to game theoretic, we can overcome this classical lower bound. In particular, Chung et al. (CRYPTO’21) showed how to achieve approximately (game-theoretically) fair leader election in the presence of majority coalitions, with round complexity as small as O(log log n) rounds. In this paper, we revisit the round complexity of game-theoretically fair leader election. We construct O(logn) rounds leader election protocols that achieve (1 - o(1 ) ) -approximate fairness in the presence of (1 - o(1 ) ) n -sized coalitions. Our protocols achieve the same round-fairness trade-offs as Chung et al.’s and have the advantage of being conceptually simpler. Finally, we also obtain game-theoretically fair protocols for committee election which might be of independent interest.

Original languageAmerican English
Title of host publicationAdvances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2022 - 42nd Annual International Cryptology Conference, CRYPTO 2022, Proceedings
EditorsYevgeniy Dodis, Thomas Shrimpton
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH
Pages409-438
Number of pages30
ISBN (Print)9783031159817
DOIs
StatePublished - 2022
Event42nd Annual International Cryptology Conference, CRYPTO 2022 - Santa Barbara, United States
Duration: 15 Aug 202218 Aug 2022

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume13509 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Conference

Conference42nd Annual International Cryptology Conference, CRYPTO 2022
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CitySanta Barbara
Period15/08/2218/08/22

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
This work is in part supported by NSF awards under the grant numbers 2044679 and 1704788, a Packard Fellowship, and a generous gift from Nikolai Mushegian.

Publisher Copyright:
© 2022, International Association for Cryptologic Research.

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