Abstract
With cheap talk, more can be achieved by long conversations than by a single message - Even when one side is strictly better informed than the other. ("Cheap talk" means plain conversation - Unmediated, nonbinding, and payoff-irrelevant.) This work characterizes the equilibrium payoffs for all two-person games in which one side is better informed than the other and cheap talk is permitted.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 1619-1660 |
Number of pages | 42 |
Journal | Econometrica |
Volume | 71 |
Issue number | 6 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 2003 |
Keywords
- Cheap talk
- Communication
- Di-span
- Dimartingale
- Game theory
- Incomplete information
- Joint lottery
- Long conversation
- Signalling