Long cheap talk

Robert J. Aumann*, Sergiu Hart

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalReview articlepeer-review

143 Scopus citations

Abstract

With cheap talk, more can be achieved by long conversations than by a single message - Even when one side is strictly better informed than the other. ("Cheap talk" means plain conversation - Unmediated, nonbinding, and payoff-irrelevant.) This work characterizes the equilibrium payoffs for all two-person games in which one side is better informed than the other and cheap talk is permitted.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1619-1660
Number of pages42
JournalEconometrica
Volume71
Issue number6
DOIs
StatePublished - 2003

Keywords

  • Cheap talk
  • Communication
  • Di-span
  • Dimartingale
  • Game theory
  • Incomplete information
  • Joint lottery
  • Long conversation
  • Signalling

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