Lost at Sea: A New Route to Metaphysical Skepticism

Aaron Segal*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Global metaphysical skepticism is the view that we have no knowledge of any substantive metaphysical thesis. Various reasons have been provided in support of global metaphysical skepticism. I provide a new one. The reason, very roughly, is this. Metaphysical theses come together as packages. Such packages are very different from each other. Because the packages are so different, we cannot know of any one of the packages that it isn't true. And because we cannot know of any one of them that it isn't true, we cannot know any substantive metaphysical thesis at all. My paper makes this argument much more precise and defends each of the premises in detail.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)256-275
Number of pages20
JournalPacific Philosophical Quarterly
Volume101
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Jun 2020

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2020 The Author. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly © 2020 University of Southern California and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

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