Markets, correlation, and regret-matching

Sergiu Hart*, Andreu Mas-Colell

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

6 Scopus citations

Abstract

Inspired by the existing work on correlated equilibria and regret-based dynamics in games, we carry out a first exploration of the links between equilibria and dynamics in (exchange) economies. The leading equilibrium concept is Walrasian equilibrium, and the dynamics (specifically, regret-matching dynamics) apply to trading games that fit the economic structure and whose pure Nash equilibria implement the Walrasian outcomes. Interestingly, in the case of quasilinear utilities (or "transferable utility"), all the concepts essentially coincide, and we get simple deterministic dynamics converging to Walrasian outcomes. Connections to sunspot equilibria are also studied.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)42-58
Number of pages17
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume93
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Sep 2015

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2015 Elsevier Inc.

Keywords

  • Correlated equilibrium
  • Deterministic regret-matching dynamics
  • Dynamics
  • Exchange economies
  • Hannan set
  • Implementation of Walrasian equilibria
  • Regret-matching
  • Socially concave games
  • Sunspot equilibrium
  • Walrasian equilibrium

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