Mechanism design over discrete domains

Ahuva Mu'alem*, Michael Schapira

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

3 Scopus citations

Abstract

Often, we wish to design incentive-compatible algorithms for settings in which the players' private information is drawn from discrete domains (e.g., integer values). Our main result is identifying discrete settings in which an algorithm can be made incentive-compatible iff the function it computes upholds a simple monotonicity constraint, known as weak-monotonicity. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first such characterization of incentive-compatibility in discrete domains (such characterizations were previously known only for inherently non-discrete domains, e.g., convex domains). We demonstrate the usefulness of this result by showing an application to the TCP-inspired congestion-control problem presented in [20].

Original languageAmerican English
Title of host publicationEC'08 - Proceedings of the 2008 ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Pages31-37
Number of pages7
DOIs
StatePublished - 2008
Event2008 ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, EC'08 - Chicago, IL, United States
Duration: 8 Jul 200812 Jul 2008

Publication series

NameProceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Conference

Conference2008 ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, EC'08
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityChicago, IL
Period8/07/0812/07/08

Keywords

  • Game theory
  • Mechanism design

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