Mechanism robustness in multilateral bargaining

Eyal Winter*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

8 Scopus citations


This paper discusses the relationship between coalitional stability and the robustness of bargaining outcomes to the bargaining procedure. We consider a class of bargaining procedures described by extensive form games, where payoff opportunities are given by a characteristic function (cooperative) game. The extensive form games differ on the probability distribution assigned to chance moves which determine the order in which players take actions. One way to define mechanism robustness is in terms of the property of 'no first mover advantage'. An equilibrium is mechanism robust if for each member the expected payoff before and after being called to propose is the same. Alternatively one can define mechanism robustness as a property of equilibrium outcomes. An outcome is said to be mechanism robust if it is supported by some equilibrium in all the extensive form games (mechanisms) within our class. We show that both definitions of mechanism robustness provide an interesting characterization of the core of the underlying cooperative game.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)131-147
Number of pages17
JournalTheory and Decision
Issue number2
StatePublished - 1996


  • Bargaining
  • Core
  • Mechanism robustness


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