Mechanisms for multi-unit auctions

Shahar Dobzinski*, Noam Nisan

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

33 Scopus citations

Abstract

We present an incentive-compatible polynomial-time approximation scheme for multi-unit auctions with general k-minded playervaluations. The mechanism fully optimizes over an appropriately chosen sub-range of possible allocations and then uses VCG payments over this sub-range. We show that obtaining a fully polynomial-time incentive-compatible approximation scheme, at least using VCG payments, is NP-hard. For the case of valuations given by black boxes, we give a polynomial-time incentive-compatible 2-approximation mechanism and show that no better is possible, at least using VCG payments.

Original languageAmerican English
Title of host publicationEC'07 - Proceedings of the Eighth Annual Conference on Electronic Commerce
Pages346-351
Number of pages6
DOIs
StatePublished - 2007
Event8th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, EC'07 - San Diego, CA, United States
Duration: 11 Jun 200715 Jun 2007

Publication series

NameEC'07 - Proceedings of the Eighth Annual Conference on Electronic Commerce

Conference

Conference8th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, EC'07
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CitySan Diego, CA
Period11/06/0715/06/07

Keywords

  • Combinatorial auctions
  • Incentive compatibility

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