In this paper we present three scheduling mechanisms that are manipulation-proof for closed systems, The amount of information that each user must encode in the mechanism increases with the complexity of the mechanism. On the other hand, the more complex the mechanism is, the more it maintains the privacy of the users. The first mechanism is a centralized, calendar-oriented one. It is the least computationally complex of the three, but does not maintain user privacy. The second is a distributed meeting-oriented mechanism that maintains user privacy, but at the cost of greater computational complexity, The third mechanism, while being the most complex, maintains user privacy (for the most part) and allows users to have the greatest influence on the resulting schedule.
|Original language||American English|
|Title of host publication||Proceedings of the 1994 ACM Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative Work, CSCW 1994|
|Publisher||Association for Computing Machinery, Inc|
|Number of pages||13|
|ISBN (Electronic)||0897916891, 9780897916899|
|State||Published - 22 Oct 1994|
|Event||1994 ACM Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative Work, CSCW 1994 - Chapel Hill, United States|
Duration: 22 Oct 1994 → 26 Oct 1994
|Name||Proceedings of the 1994 ACM Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative Work, CSCW 1994|
|Conference||1994 ACM Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative Work, CSCW 1994|
|Period||22/10/94 → 26/10/94|
Bibliographical noteFunding Information:
All three mechanisms, however, are manipulable. We thus introduced the Clarke Tax as a method for removing manipulability from the above three scheduling mechanisms. It was shown that using this taxation technique, we are able to maintain all the previous positive attributes of the original mechanisms, while removing manipulability, We also showed how additional user privacy could be maintained at the cost of decreased stability of the system, how users of varying influence could be incorporated into the scheduling system and how soft constraints could be handled, ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This work has been supported in part by the Air Force Office of Scientific Research (Contract F49620-92-J-0422), by the Rome Laboratory (RL) of the Air Force Material Command and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (Contract F30602-93-C-O038), by an NSF Young Investigator’s Award (IRI-9258392) to Prof. Martha Pollack and by the Israel academy of sciences and humanities (Wolfson Grant), the Israeli Ministry of Science and Technology (Grant 032-8284).
© 1994 ACM.
- Game theory
- Meetings scheduling