@inproceedings{25b57864f6d94573abf95e72fad948b6,
title = "Mixed strategies in combinatorial agency: (Extended abstract)",
abstract = "We study a setting where a principal needs to motivate a team of agents whose combination of hidden efforts stochastically determines an outcome. In a companion paper we devise and study a basic {"}combinatorial agency{"} model for this setting, where the principal is restricted to inducing a pure Nash equilibrium. Here, we show that the principal may possibly gain from inducing a mixed equilibrium, but this gain can be bounded for various families of technologies (in particular if a technology has symmetric combinatorial structure). In addition, we present a sufficient condition under which mixed strategies yield no gain to the principal.",
author = "Moshe Babaioff and Michal Feldman and Noam Nisan",
year = "2006",
doi = "10.1007/11944874_32",
language = "American English",
isbn = "3540681388",
series = "Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)",
pages = "353--364",
booktitle = "Internet and Network Economics - Second International Workshop, WINE 2006, Proceedings",
note = "2nd International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2006 ; Conference date: 15-12-2006 Through 17-12-2006",
}