Mixed strategies in combinatorial agency: (Extended abstract)

Moshe Babaioff*, Michal Feldman, Noam Nisan

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

14 Scopus citations


We study a setting where a principal needs to motivate a team of agents whose combination of hidden efforts stochastically determines an outcome. In a companion paper we devise and study a basic "combinatorial agency" model for this setting, where the principal is restricted to inducing a pure Nash equilibrium. Here, we show that the principal may possibly gain from inducing a mixed equilibrium, but this gain can be bounded for various families of technologies (in particular if a technology has symmetric combinatorial structure). In addition, we present a sufficient condition under which mixed strategies yield no gain to the principal.

Original languageAmerican English
Title of host publicationInternet and Network Economics - Second International Workshop, WINE 2006, Proceedings
Number of pages12
StatePublished - 2006
Event2nd International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2006 - Patras, Greece
Duration: 15 Dec 200617 Dec 2006

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume4286 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349


Conference2nd International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2006


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