Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency

Parimal Kanti Bag, Hamid Sabourian*, Eyal Winter

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

18 Scopus citations

Abstract

A class of voting procedures based on repeated ballots and elimination of one candidate in each round is shown to always induce an outcome in the top cycle and is thus Condorcet consistent, when voters behave strategically. This is an important class as it covers multi-stage, sequential elimination extensions of all standard one-shot voting rules (with the exception of negative voting), the same one-shot rules that would fail Condorcet consistency. The necessity of repeated ballots and sequential elimination are demonstrated by further showing that Condorcet consistency would fail in all standard voting rules that violate one or both of these conditions.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)1278-1299
Number of pages22
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume144
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - May 2009

Keywords

  • Condorcet consistency
  • Markov equilibrium
  • Multi-stage voting
  • Scoring rules
  • Sequential elimination
  • Top cycle

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