TY - GEN
T1 - Multi-unit auctions with budget limits
AU - Dobzinski, Shahar
AU - Lavi, Ron
AU - Nisan, Noam
PY - 2008
Y1 - 2008
N2 - We study multi-unit auctions where the bidders have a budget constraint, a situation very common in practice that has received very little attention in the auction theory literature. Our main result is an impossibility: there are no incentive-compatible auctions that always produce a Pareto-optimal allocation. We also obtain some surprising positive results for certain special cases.
AB - We study multi-unit auctions where the bidders have a budget constraint, a situation very common in practice that has received very little attention in the auction theory literature. Our main result is an impossibility: there are no incentive-compatible auctions that always produce a Pareto-optimal allocation. We also obtain some surprising positive results for certain special cases.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=57949113671&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/FOCS.2008.39
DO - 10.1109/FOCS.2008.39
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AN - SCOPUS:57949113671
SN - 9780769534367
T3 - Proceedings - Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS
SP - 260
EP - 269
BT - Proceedings of the 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS 2008
PB - IEEE Computer Society
T2 - 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS 2008
Y2 - 25 October 2008 through 28 October 2008
ER -