Multi-unit auctions with budget limits

Shahar Dobzinski*, Ron Lavi, Noam Nisan

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

67 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study multi-unit auctions where the bidders have a budget constraint, a situation very common in practice that has received very little attention in the auction theory literature. Our main result is an impossibility: there are no incentive-compatible auctions that always produce a Pareto-optimal allocation. We also obtain some surprising positive results for certain special cases.

Original languageAmerican English
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS 2008
PublisherIEEE Computer Society
Pages260-269
Number of pages10
ISBN (Print)9780769534367
DOIs
StatePublished - 2008
Event49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS 2008 - Philadelphia, PA, United States
Duration: 25 Oct 200828 Oct 2008

Publication series

NameProceedings - Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS
ISSN (Print)0272-5428

Conference

Conference49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS 2008
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityPhiladelphia, PA
Period25/10/0828/10/08

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