Multi-winner elections: Complexity of manipulation, control, and winner-determination

Ariel D. Procaccia, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein, Aviv Zohar

Research output: Contribution to journalConference articlepeer-review

37 Scopus citations

Abstract

Although recent years have seen a surge of interest in the computational aspects of social choice, no attention has previously been devoted to elections with multiple winners, e.g., elections of an assembly or committee. In this paper, we fully characterize the worst-case complexity of manipulation and control in the context of four prominent multi-winner voting systems. Additionally, we show that several tailor-made multi-winner voting schemes are impractical, as it is NP-hard to select the winners in these schemes.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)1476-1481
Number of pages6
JournalIJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
StatePublished - 2007
Event20th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2007 - Hyderabad, India
Duration: 6 Jan 200712 Jan 2007

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