Multiagent graph coloring: Pareto efficiency, fairness and individual rationality

Yaad Blum*, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

We consider a multiagent extension of single-agent graph coloring. Multiple agents hold disjoint autonomous subgraphs of a global graph, and every color used by the agents in coloring the graph has associated cost. In this multiagent graph coloring scenario, we seek a minimum legal coloring of the global graph's vertices, such that the coloring is also Pareto efficient, socially fair, and individual rational. We analyze complexity of individual-rational solutions in special graph classes where classical coloring algorithms are known. Multiagent graph coloring has application to a wide variety of multiagent coordination problems, including multiagent scheduling.

Original languageAmerican English
Title of host publicationAAAI-08/IAAI-08 Proceedings - 23rd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence and the 20th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference
Pages24-29
Number of pages6
StatePublished - 2008
Event23rd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence and the 20th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, AAAI-08/IAAI-08 - Chicago, IL, United States
Duration: 13 Jul 200817 Jul 2008

Publication series

NameProceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Volume1

Conference

Conference23rd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence and the 20th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, AAAI-08/IAAI-08
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityChicago, IL
Period13/07/0817/07/08

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Multiagent graph coloring: Pareto efficiency, fairness and individual rationality'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this