Multilateral deferred-acceptance mechanisms

Liad Blumrosen*, Osnat Zohar

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

3 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study the design of multilateral markets, where agents with several different roles engage in trade. We first observe that the modular approach proposed by D¨utting et al. [5] for bilateral markets can also be applied in multilateral markets. This gives a general method to design Deferred Acceptance mechanisms in such settings; these mechanisms, defined by Milgrom and Segal [10], are known to satisfy some highly desired properties. We then show applications of this framework in the context of supply chains. We show how existing mechanisms can be implemented as multilateral Deferred Acceptance mechanisms, and thus exhibit nice practical properties (as group strategy-proofness and equivalence to clock auctions). We use the general framework to design a novel mechanism that improves upon previous mechanisms in terms of social welfare. Our mechanism manages to avoid “trade reduction” in some scenarios, while maintaining the incentive and budget-balance properties.

Original languageAmerican English
Title of host publicationWeb and Internet Economics - 11th International Conference, WINE 2015, Proceedings
EditorsGuido Schäfer, Evangelos Markakis
PublisherSpringer Verlag
Pages173-186
Number of pages14
ISBN (Print)9783662489949
DOIs
StatePublished - 2015
Event11th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, WINE 2015 - Amsterdam, Netherlands
Duration: 9 Dec 201512 Dec 2015

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume9470
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Conference

Conference11th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, WINE 2015
Country/TerritoryNetherlands
CityAmsterdam
Period9/12/1512/12/15

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015.

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