Multilateral deferred-acceptance mechanisms

Liad Blumrosen; Osnat Zohar

doi:10.1007/978-3-662-48995-6_13

Multilateral deferred-acceptance mechanisms

Liad Blumrosen^*, Osnat Zohar

^*Corresponding author for this work

Business Administration

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

3 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study the design of multilateral markets, where agents with several different roles engage in trade. We first observe that the modular approach proposed by D¨utting et al. [5] for bilateral markets can also be applied in multilateral markets. This gives a general method to design Deferred Acceptance mechanisms in such settings; these mechanisms, defined by Milgrom and Segal [10], are known to satisfy some highly desired properties. We then show applications of this framework in the context of supply chains. We show how existing mechanisms can be implemented as multilateral Deferred Acceptance mechanisms, and thus exhibit nice practical properties (as group strategy-proofness and equivalence to clock auctions). We use the general framework to design a novel mechanism that improves upon previous mechanisms in terms of social welfare. Our mechanism manages to avoid “trade reduction” in some scenarios, while maintaining the incentive and budget-balance properties.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Web and Internet Economics - 11th International Conference, WINE 2015, Proceedings
Editors	Guido Schäfer, Evangelos Markakis
Publisher	Springer Verlag
Pages	173-186
Number of pages	14
ISBN (Print)	9783662489949
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48995-6_13
State	Published - 2015
Event	11th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, WINE 2015 - Amsterdam, Netherlands Duration: 9 Dec 2015 → 12 Dec 2015

Publication series

Name	Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume	9470
ISSN (Print)	0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)	1611-3349

Conference

Conference	11th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, WINE 2015
Country/Territory	Netherlands
City	Amsterdam
Period	9/12/15 → 12/12/15

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015.

Access to Document

10.1007/978-3-662-48995-6_13

Cite this

Blumrosen, L., & Zohar, O. (2015). Multilateral deferred-acceptance mechanisms. In G. Schäfer, & E. Markakis (Eds.), Web and Internet Economics - 11th International Conference, WINE 2015, Proceedings (pp. 173-186). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 9470). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48995-6_13

Blumrosen, Liad ; Zohar, Osnat. / Multilateral deferred-acceptance mechanisms. Web and Internet Economics - 11th International Conference, WINE 2015, Proceedings. editor / Guido Schäfer ; Evangelos Markakis. Springer Verlag, 2015. pp. 173-186 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)).

@inproceedings{01a38d972abd4a0b8b752c228d21eb0b,

title = "Multilateral deferred-acceptance mechanisms",

abstract = "We study the design of multilateral markets, where agents with several different roles engage in trade. We first observe that the modular approach proposed by D¨utting et al. [5] for bilateral markets can also be applied in multilateral markets. This gives a general method to design Deferred Acceptance mechanisms in such settings; these mechanisms, defined by Milgrom and Segal [10], are known to satisfy some highly desired properties. We then show applications of this framework in the context of supply chains. We show how existing mechanisms can be implemented as multilateral Deferred Acceptance mechanisms, and thus exhibit nice practical properties (as group strategy-proofness and equivalence to clock auctions). We use the general framework to design a novel mechanism that improves upon previous mechanisms in terms of social welfare. Our mechanism manages to avoid “trade reduction” in some scenarios, while maintaining the incentive and budget-balance properties.",

author = "Liad Blumrosen and Osnat Zohar",

note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015.; 11th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, WINE 2015 ; Conference date: 09-12-2015 Through 12-12-2015",

year = "2015",

doi = "10.1007/978-3-662-48995-6_13",

language = "אנגלית",

isbn = "9783662489949",

series = "Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)",

publisher = "Springer Verlag",

pages = "173--186",

editor = "Guido Sch{\"a}fer and Evangelos Markakis",

booktitle = "Web and Internet Economics - 11th International Conference, WINE 2015, Proceedings",

address = "גרמניה",

}

Blumrosen, L & Zohar, O 2015, Multilateral deferred-acceptance mechanisms. in G Schäfer & E Markakis (eds), Web and Internet Economics - 11th International Conference, WINE 2015, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 9470, Springer Verlag, pp. 173-186, 11th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, WINE 2015, Amsterdam, Netherlands, 9/12/15. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48995-6_13

Multilateral deferred-acceptance mechanisms. / Blumrosen, Liad; Zohar, Osnat.
Web and Internet Economics - 11th International Conference, WINE 2015, Proceedings. ed. / Guido Schäfer; Evangelos Markakis. Springer Verlag, 2015. p. 173-186 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 9470).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

TY - GEN

T1 - Multilateral deferred-acceptance mechanisms

AU - Blumrosen, Liad

AU - Zohar, Osnat

N1 - Publisher Copyright: © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015.

PY - 2015

Y1 - 2015

N2 - We study the design of multilateral markets, where agents with several different roles engage in trade. We first observe that the modular approach proposed by D¨utting et al. [5] for bilateral markets can also be applied in multilateral markets. This gives a general method to design Deferred Acceptance mechanisms in such settings; these mechanisms, defined by Milgrom and Segal [10], are known to satisfy some highly desired properties. We then show applications of this framework in the context of supply chains. We show how existing mechanisms can be implemented as multilateral Deferred Acceptance mechanisms, and thus exhibit nice practical properties (as group strategy-proofness and equivalence to clock auctions). We use the general framework to design a novel mechanism that improves upon previous mechanisms in terms of social welfare. Our mechanism manages to avoid “trade reduction” in some scenarios, while maintaining the incentive and budget-balance properties.

AB - We study the design of multilateral markets, where agents with several different roles engage in trade. We first observe that the modular approach proposed by D¨utting et al. [5] for bilateral markets can also be applied in multilateral markets. This gives a general method to design Deferred Acceptance mechanisms in such settings; these mechanisms, defined by Milgrom and Segal [10], are known to satisfy some highly desired properties. We then show applications of this framework in the context of supply chains. We show how existing mechanisms can be implemented as multilateral Deferred Acceptance mechanisms, and thus exhibit nice practical properties (as group strategy-proofness and equivalence to clock auctions). We use the general framework to design a novel mechanism that improves upon previous mechanisms in terms of social welfare. Our mechanism manages to avoid “trade reduction” in some scenarios, while maintaining the incentive and budget-balance properties.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84951871798&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/978-3-662-48995-6_13

DO - 10.1007/978-3-662-48995-6_13

M3 - ???researchoutput.researchoutputtypes.contributiontobookanthology.conference???

AN - SCOPUS:84951871798

SN - 9783662489949

T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

SP - 173

EP - 186

BT - Web and Internet Economics - 11th International Conference, WINE 2015, Proceedings

A2 - Schäfer, Guido

A2 - Markakis, Evangelos

PB - Springer Verlag

T2 - 11th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, WINE 2015

Y2 - 9 December 2015 through 12 December 2015

ER -

Blumrosen L, Zohar O. Multilateral deferred-acceptance mechanisms. In Schäfer G, Markakis E, editors, Web and Internet Economics - 11th International Conference, WINE 2015, Proceedings. Springer Verlag. 2015. p. 173-186. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)). doi: 10.1007/978-3-662-48995-6_13

Multilateral deferred-acceptance mechanisms

Abstract

Publication series

Conference

Bibliographical note

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this