@inproceedings{de49ba175bfa4b62bf66469aaa70e7c1,
title = "Nearly optimal multi attribute auctions",
abstract = "In almost every procurement situation, non-price attributes of the items to be purchased play a crucial role. Procurement protocols which take these attributes into account are called multi-attribute auctions. We study the following problem called optimal multi-attribute auction design: A buyer wants to procure an item which can be supplied in many possible configurations. The buyer has a value v(x) for each possible configuration x. Every seller i has a privately known cost ci.(x) of supplying each possible configuration. Given a probability distribution on the cost functions, our goal is to design an auction which maximizes the expected utility of the buyer. This paper offers a generic method for the construction of nearly optimal multi-attribute auctions. The computational time of our mechanisms equals the time required for computing (or approximating) the optimal mechanism on a small number of agents. Our method can be successfully applied to many variants of multiattribute auction design.",
keywords = "Multi attribute auctions, Optimal auctions, Polynomial time",
author = "Amir Ronen and Daniel Lehmann",
year = "2005",
month = jun,
day = "5",
doi = "10.1145/1064009.1064039",
language = "אנגלית",
series = "Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce",
publisher = "Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)",
pages = "279--285",
booktitle = "EC'05",
address = "ארצות הברית",
note = "6th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, EC 2005 ; Conference date: 05-06-2005 Through 08-06-2005",
}