Negotiation-range mechanisms: Exploring the limits of truthful efficient markets

Yair Bartal; Rica Gonen; Pierfrancesco La Mura

Negotiation-range mechanisms: Exploring the limits of truthful efficient markets

Yair Bartal^*, Rica Gonen, Pierfrancesco La Mura

^*Corresponding author for this work

The Rachel and Selim Benin School of Engineering and Computer Science

Research output: Contribution to conference › Paper › peer-review

8 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper introduces a new class of mechanisms based on negotiation between market participants. This model allows us to circumvent Myerson and Satterthwaite's impossibility result and present a bilateral market mechanism that is efficient, individually rational, incentive compatible and budget balanced in the single-unit heterogeneous setting. The underlying scheme makes this combination of desirable qualities possible by reporting a price range for each buyer-seller pair that defines a zone of possible agreements, while the final price is left open for negotiation.

Original language	English
Pages	1-8
Number of pages	8
State	Published - 2004
Event	Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce,EC'04 - New York, NY, United States Duration: 17 May 2004 → 20 May 2004

Conference

Conference	Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce,EC'04
Country/Territory	United States
City	New York, NY
Period	17/05/04 → 20/05/04

Keywords

Efficient Markets
Mechanism Design
Negotiation-Range Mechanisms

Cite this

@conference{07f22c4476334ad9a90504ced7eb8ae3,

title = "Negotiation-range mechanisms: Exploring the limits of truthful efficient markets",

abstract = "This paper introduces a new class of mechanisms based on negotiation between market participants. This model allows us to circumvent Myerson and Satterthwaite's impossibility result and present a bilateral market mechanism that is efficient, individually rational, incentive compatible and budget balanced in the single-unit heterogeneous setting. The underlying scheme makes this combination of desirable qualities possible by reporting a price range for each buyer-seller pair that defines a zone of possible agreements, while the final price is left open for negotiation.",

keywords = "Efficient Markets, Mechanism Design, Negotiation-Range Mechanisms",

author = "Yair Bartal and Rica Gonen and {La Mura}, Pierfrancesco",

year = "2004",

language = "אנגלית",

pages = "1--8",

note = "Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce,EC'04 ; Conference date: 17-05-2004 Through 20-05-2004",

}

TY - CONF

T1 - Negotiation-range mechanisms

T2 - Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce,EC'04

AU - Bartal, Yair

AU - Gonen, Rica

AU - La Mura, Pierfrancesco

PY - 2004

Y1 - 2004

N2 - This paper introduces a new class of mechanisms based on negotiation between market participants. This model allows us to circumvent Myerson and Satterthwaite's impossibility result and present a bilateral market mechanism that is efficient, individually rational, incentive compatible and budget balanced in the single-unit heterogeneous setting. The underlying scheme makes this combination of desirable qualities possible by reporting a price range for each buyer-seller pair that defines a zone of possible agreements, while the final price is left open for negotiation.

AB - This paper introduces a new class of mechanisms based on negotiation between market participants. This model allows us to circumvent Myerson and Satterthwaite's impossibility result and present a bilateral market mechanism that is efficient, individually rational, incentive compatible and budget balanced in the single-unit heterogeneous setting. The underlying scheme makes this combination of desirable qualities possible by reporting a price range for each buyer-seller pair that defines a zone of possible agreements, while the final price is left open for negotiation.

KW - Efficient Markets

KW - Mechanism Design

KW - Negotiation-Range Mechanisms

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=3242812800&partnerID=8YFLogxK

M3 - ???researchoutput.researchoutputtypes.contributiontoconference.paper???

AN - SCOPUS:3242812800

SP - 1

EP - 8

Y2 - 17 May 2004 through 20 May 2004

ER -

Negotiation-range mechanisms: Exploring the limits of truthful efficient markets

Abstract

Conference

Keywords

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this