Negotiation-range mechanisms: Exploring the limits of truthful efficient markets

Yair Bartal*, Rica Gonen, Pierfrancesco La Mura

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaperpeer-review

8 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper introduces a new class of mechanisms based on negotiation between market participants. This model allows us to circumvent Myerson and Satterthwaite's impossibility result and present a bilateral market mechanism that is efficient, individually rational, incentive compatible and budget balanced in the single-unit heterogeneous setting. The underlying scheme makes this combination of desirable qualities possible by reporting a price range for each buyer-seller pair that defines a zone of possible agreements, while the final price is left open for negotiation.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages1-8
Number of pages8
StatePublished - 2004
EventProceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce,EC'04 - New York, NY, United States
Duration: 17 May 200420 May 2004

Conference

ConferenceProceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce,EC'04
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityNew York, NY
Period17/05/0420/05/04

Keywords

  • Efficient Markets
  • Mechanism Design
  • Negotiation-Range Mechanisms

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