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Negotiation-range mechanisms: Exploring the limits of truthful efficient markets

  • Yair Bartal*
  • , Rica Gonen
  • , Pierfrancesco La Mura
  • *Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

8 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper introduces a new class of mechanisms based on negotiation between market participants. This model allows us to circumvent Myerson and Satterthwaite's impossibility result and present a bilateral market mechanism that is efficient, individually rational, incentive compatible and budget balanced in the single-unit heterogeneous setting. The underlying scheme makes this combination of desirable qualities possible by reporting a price range for each buyer-seller pair that defines a zone of possible agreements, while the final price is left open for negotiation.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, EC'04
PublisherAssociation for Computing Machinery
Pages1-8
Number of pages8
ISBN (Print)9781581137712
DOIs
StatePublished - 17 May 2004
Event5th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce,EC 2004 - New York, NY, United States
Duration: 17 May 200420 May 2004

Publication series

NameProceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Volume5

Conference

Conference5th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce,EC 2004
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityNew York, NY
Period17/05/0420/05/04

Keywords

  • Efficient Markets
  • Mechanism Design
  • Negotiation-Range Mechanisms

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