Negotiation with incomplete information about worth: Strict versus tolerant mechanisms

Gilad Zlotkin; Jeffrey S. Rosenschein

doi:10.1007/3-540-58266-5_7

Negotiation with incomplete information about worth: Strict versus tolerant mechanisms

Gilad Zlotkin, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein

The Rachel and Selim Benin School of Engineering and Computer Science

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

Abstract

Research in Distributed Artificial Intelligence (DAI) has for years been concerned with mechanisms of negotiation. In previous work, we considered situations where agents’ goals were private information [12, 14, 15]. In order to carry out the negotiation, the agents were to declare, in a -1-phase, their goals. We then analyzed what goal declaration strategies the agents might adopt to increase their utility. In this paper, we consider an inverted situation, where the agents’ goals (and therefore stand-alone costs) are common knowledge, but where the worth they attach to their goals is private information. The agents declare, in a -1-phase, their worths, which are then used as a baseline to the utility calculation (and thus affect the negotiation outcome). We are concerned with analyzing what worth declaration strategies the agents might adopt to increase their utility. We introduce two mechanisms, one “strict,” the other “tolerant,” and analyze their affects on the stability and efficiency of negotiation outcomes. The strict mechanism turns out to be more stable, while the tolerant mechanism is more efficient.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Artificial Social Systems - 4th European Workshop on Modelling Autonomous Agents in a Multi-Agent World, MAAMAW 1992, Selected Papers
Editors	Cristiano Castelfranchi, Eric Werner
Publisher	Springer Verlag
Pages	115-132
Number of pages	18
ISBN (Print)	9783540582663
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-58266-5_7
State	Published - 1994
Event	4th European Workshop on Modelling Autonomous Agents in a Multi-Agent World, MAAMAW 1992 - S. Martino al Cimino, Italy Duration: 29 Jul 1992 → 31 Jul 1992

Publication series

Name	Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume	830 LNAI
ISSN (Print)	0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)	1611-3349

Conference

Conference	4th European Workshop on Modelling Autonomous Agents in a Multi-Agent World, MAAMAW 1992
Country/Territory	Italy
City	S. Martino al Cimino
Period	29/07/92 → 31/07/92

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 1994, Springer Verlag. All rights reserved.

Access to Document

10.1007/3-540-58266-5_7

Cite this

Zlotkin, G., & Rosenschein, J. S. (1994). Negotiation with incomplete information about worth: Strict versus tolerant mechanisms. In C. Castelfranchi, & E. Werner (Eds.), Artificial Social Systems - 4th European Workshop on Modelling Autonomous Agents in a Multi-Agent World, MAAMAW 1992, Selected Papers (pp. 115-132). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 830 LNAI). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-58266-5_7

Zlotkin, Gilad ; Rosenschein, Jeffrey S. / Negotiation with incomplete information about worth : Strict versus tolerant mechanisms. Artificial Social Systems - 4th European Workshop on Modelling Autonomous Agents in a Multi-Agent World, MAAMAW 1992, Selected Papers. editor / Cristiano Castelfranchi ; Eric Werner. Springer Verlag, 1994. pp. 115-132 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)).

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Zlotkin, G & Rosenschein, JS 1994, Negotiation with incomplete information about worth: Strict versus tolerant mechanisms. in C Castelfranchi & E Werner (eds), Artificial Social Systems - 4th European Workshop on Modelling Autonomous Agents in a Multi-Agent World, MAAMAW 1992, Selected Papers. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 830 LNAI, Springer Verlag, pp. 115-132, 4th European Workshop on Modelling Autonomous Agents in a Multi-Agent World, MAAMAW 1992, S. Martino al Cimino, Italy, 29/07/92. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-58266-5_7

Negotiation with incomplete information about worth: Strict versus tolerant mechanisms. / Zlotkin, Gilad; Rosenschein, Jeffrey S.
Artificial Social Systems - 4th European Workshop on Modelling Autonomous Agents in a Multi-Agent World, MAAMAW 1992, Selected Papers. ed. / Cristiano Castelfranchi; Eric Werner. Springer Verlag, 1994. p. 115-132 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 830 LNAI).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

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Zlotkin G, Rosenschein JS. Negotiation with incomplete information about worth: Strict versus tolerant mechanisms. In Castelfranchi C, Werner E, editors, Artificial Social Systems - 4th European Workshop on Modelling Autonomous Agents in a Multi-Agent World, MAAMAW 1992, Selected Papers. Springer Verlag. 1994. p. 115-132. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)). doi: 10.1007/3-540-58266-5_7

Negotiation with incomplete information about worth: Strict versus tolerant mechanisms

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