Negotiation with incomplete information about worth: Strict versus tolerant mechanisms

Gilad Zlotkin, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

Research in Distributed Artificial Intelligence (DAI) has for years been concerned with mechanisms of negotiation. In previous work, we considered situations where agents’ goals were private information [12, 14, 15]. In order to carry out the negotiation, the agents were to declare, in a -1-phase, their goals. We then analyzed what goal declaration strategies the agents might adopt to increase their utility. In this paper, we consider an inverted situation, where the agents’ goals (and therefore stand-alone costs) are common knowledge, but where the worth they attach to their goals is private information. The agents declare, in a -1-phase, their worths, which are then used as a baseline to the utility calculation (and thus affect the negotiation outcome). We are concerned with analyzing what worth declaration strategies the agents might adopt to increase their utility. We introduce two mechanisms, one “strict,” the other “tolerant,” and analyze their affects on the stability and efficiency of negotiation outcomes. The strict mechanism turns out to be more stable, while the tolerant mechanism is more efficient.

Original languageAmerican English
Title of host publicationArtificial Social Systems - 4th European Workshop on Modelling Autonomous Agents in a Multi-Agent World, MAAMAW 1992, Selected Papers
EditorsCristiano Castelfranchi, Eric Werner
PublisherSpringer Verlag
Pages115-132
Number of pages18
ISBN (Print)9783540582663
DOIs
StatePublished - 1994
Event4th European Workshop on Modelling Autonomous Agents in a Multi-Agent World, MAAMAW 1992 - S. Martino al Cimino, Italy
Duration: 29 Jul 199231 Jul 1992

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume830 LNAI
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Conference

Conference4th European Workshop on Modelling Autonomous Agents in a Multi-Agent World, MAAMAW 1992
Country/TerritoryItaly
CityS. Martino al Cimino
Period29/07/9231/07/92

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 1994, Springer Verlag. All rights reserved.

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