Research in Distributed Artificial Intelligence (DAI) has for years been concerned with mechanisms of negotiation. In previous work, we considered situations where agents’ goals were private information [12, 14, 15]. In order to carry out the negotiation, the agents were to declare, in a -1-phase, their goals. We then analyzed what goal declaration strategies the agents might adopt to increase their utility. In this paper, we consider an inverted situation, where the agents’ goals (and therefore stand-alone costs) are common knowledge, but where the worth they attach to their goals is private information. The agents declare, in a -1-phase, their worths, which are then used as a baseline to the utility calculation (and thus affect the negotiation outcome). We are concerned with analyzing what worth declaration strategies the agents might adopt to increase their utility. We introduce two mechanisms, one “strict,” the other “tolerant,” and analyze their affects on the stability and efficiency of negotiation outcomes. The strict mechanism turns out to be more stable, while the tolerant mechanism is more efficient.
|Original language||American English|
|Title of host publication||Artificial Social Systems - 4th European Workshop on Modelling Autonomous Agents in a Multi-Agent World, MAAMAW 1992, Selected Papers|
|Editors||Cristiano Castelfranchi, Eric Werner|
|Number of pages||18|
|State||Published - 1994|
|Event||4th European Workshop on Modelling Autonomous Agents in a Multi-Agent World, MAAMAW 1992 - S. Martino al Cimino, Italy|
Duration: 29 Jul 1992 → 31 Jul 1992
|Name||Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)|
|Conference||4th European Workshop on Modelling Autonomous Agents in a Multi-Agent World, MAAMAW 1992|
|City||S. Martino al Cimino|
|Period||29/07/92 → 31/07/92|
Bibliographical noteFunding Information:
This research has been partially supported by the Leibniz Center for Research in Computer Science, and by the Israeli Ministry of Science and Technology (Grant
© 1994, Springer Verlag. All rights reserved.