Abstract
We propose a non-cooperative bargaining approach to the problem of collective decision making in committees by modelling this process as a sequential bargaining game. The main objective of the paper is to discuss the formation of the agenda in multi-issue committees, and its relation to the importance of the issues. We start by asserting that in the case of a single issue the set of all equilibrium outcomes of our game coincides with the set of coalitional stable outcomes. We then consider multi-issue committees to discuss the problem of forming agendas. We argue that from the point of view of efficiency and stability the most important issues should be put first on the agenda. We conclude with a sufficient condition (on players' preferences), which guarantees the efficiency and stability of the bargaining outcomes for every possible agenda.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 323-342 |
| Number of pages | 20 |
| Journal | Journal of Public Economics |
| Volume | 65 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Sep 1997 |
Bibliographical note
Funding Information:I wish to thank the German Israeli Foundation for its generous financial support. I am also grateful for valuable comments by seminar participants at Brown, Kyoto, McGill, Penn, Pittsburgh, Princeton and Toronto.
Keywords
- Agenda
- Committees
- Negotiations
