Negotiations in multi-issue committees

Eyal Winter

doi:10.1016/S0047-2727(96)01627-1

Negotiations in multi-issue committees

Eyal Winter^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

18 Scopus citations

Abstract

We propose a non-cooperative bargaining approach to the problem of collective decision making in committees by modelling this process as a sequential bargaining game. The main objective of the paper is to discuss the formation of the agenda in multi-issue committees, and its relation to the importance of the issues. We start by asserting that in the case of a single issue the set of all equilibrium outcomes of our game coincides with the set of coalitional stable outcomes. We then consider multi-issue committees to discuss the problem of forming agendas. We argue that from the point of view of efficiency and stability the most important issues should be put first on the agenda. We conclude with a sufficient condition (on players' preferences), which guarantees the efficiency and stability of the bargaining outcomes for every possible agenda.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	323-342
Number of pages	20
Journal	Journal of Public Economics
Volume	65
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2727(96)01627-1
State	Published - Sep 1997

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
I wish to thank the German Israeli Foundation for its generous financial support. I am also grateful for valuable comments by seminar participants at Brown, Kyoto, McGill, Penn, Pittsburgh, Princeton and Toronto.

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

SDG 15 Life on Land
SDG 17 Partnerships for the Goals

Keywords

Agenda
Committees
Negotiations

Access to Document

10.1016/S0047-2727(96)01627-1

Cite this

@article{a23affed040749a6b724d9cad11c2905,

title = "Negotiations in multi-issue committees",

abstract = "We propose a non-cooperative bargaining approach to the problem of collective decision making in committees by modelling this process as a sequential bargaining game. The main objective of the paper is to discuss the formation of the agenda in multi-issue committees, and its relation to the importance of the issues. We start by asserting that in the case of a single issue the set of all equilibrium outcomes of our game coincides with the set of coalitional stable outcomes. We then consider multi-issue committees to discuss the problem of forming agendas. We argue that from the point of view of efficiency and stability the most important issues should be put first on the agenda. We conclude with a sufficient condition (on players' preferences), which guarantees the efficiency and stability of the bargaining outcomes for every possible agenda.",

keywords = "Agenda, Committees, Negotiations",

author = "Eyal Winter",

note = "Funding Information: I wish to thank the German Israeli Foundation for its generous financial support. I am also grateful for valuable comments by seminar participants at Brown, Kyoto, McGill, Penn, Pittsburgh, Princeton and Toronto.",

year = "1997",

month = sep,

doi = "10.1016/S0047-2727(96)01627-1",

language = "אנגלית",

volume = "65",

pages = "323--342",

journal = "Journal of Public Economics",

issn = "0047-2727",

publisher = "Elsevier B.V.",

number = "3",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Negotiations in multi-issue committees

AU - Winter, Eyal

N1 - Funding Information: I wish to thank the German Israeli Foundation for its generous financial support. I am also grateful for valuable comments by seminar participants at Brown, Kyoto, McGill, Penn, Pittsburgh, Princeton and Toronto.

PY - 1997/9

Y1 - 1997/9

N2 - We propose a non-cooperative bargaining approach to the problem of collective decision making in committees by modelling this process as a sequential bargaining game. The main objective of the paper is to discuss the formation of the agenda in multi-issue committees, and its relation to the importance of the issues. We start by asserting that in the case of a single issue the set of all equilibrium outcomes of our game coincides with the set of coalitional stable outcomes. We then consider multi-issue committees to discuss the problem of forming agendas. We argue that from the point of view of efficiency and stability the most important issues should be put first on the agenda. We conclude with a sufficient condition (on players' preferences), which guarantees the efficiency and stability of the bargaining outcomes for every possible agenda.

AB - We propose a non-cooperative bargaining approach to the problem of collective decision making in committees by modelling this process as a sequential bargaining game. The main objective of the paper is to discuss the formation of the agenda in multi-issue committees, and its relation to the importance of the issues. We start by asserting that in the case of a single issue the set of all equilibrium outcomes of our game coincides with the set of coalitional stable outcomes. We then consider multi-issue committees to discuss the problem of forming agendas. We argue that from the point of view of efficiency and stability the most important issues should be put first on the agenda. We conclude with a sufficient condition (on players' preferences), which guarantees the efficiency and stability of the bargaining outcomes for every possible agenda.

KW - Agenda

KW - Committees

KW - Negotiations

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/0031232109

U2 - 10.1016/S0047-2727(96)01627-1

DO - 10.1016/S0047-2727(96)01627-1

M3 - ???researchoutput.researchoutputtypes.contributiontojournal.article???

AN - SCOPUS:0031232109

SN - 0047-2727

VL - 65

SP - 323

EP - 342

JO - Journal of Public Economics

JF - Journal of Public Economics

IS - 3

ER -

Negotiations in multi-issue committees

Abstract

Bibliographical note

UN SDGs

Keywords

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this