Networks of complements

Moshe Babaioff, Liad Blumrosen, Noam Nisan

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

3 Scopus citations

Abstract

We consider a network of sellers, each selling a single product, where the graph structure represents pair-wise complementarities between products. We study how the network structure affects revenue and social welfare of equilibria of the pricing game between the sellers. We prove positive and negative results, both of "Price of Anarchy" and of "Price of Stability" type, for special families of graphs (paths, cycles) as well as more general ones (trees, graphs). We describe best-reply dynamics that converge to non-trivial equilibrium in several families of graphs, and we use these dynamics to prove the existence of approximately-efficient equilibria.

Original languageAmerican English
Title of host publication43rd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming, ICALP 2016
EditorsYuval Rabani, Ioannis Chatzigiannakis, Davide Sangiorgi, Michael Mitzenmacher
PublisherSchloss Dagstuhl- Leibniz-Zentrum fur Informatik GmbH, Dagstuhl Publishing
ISBN (Electronic)9783959770132
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Aug 2016
Event43rd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming, ICALP 2016 - Rome, Italy
Duration: 12 Jul 201615 Jul 2016

Publication series

NameLeibniz International Proceedings in Informatics, LIPIcs
Volume55
ISSN (Print)1868-8969

Conference

Conference43rd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming, ICALP 2016
Country/TerritoryItaly
CityRome
Period12/07/1615/07/16

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© Moshe Babaioff, Liad Blumrosen, and Noam Nisan.

Keywords

  • Complements
  • Game Theory
  • Networks
  • Price of Stability
  • Pricing

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