Abstract
We consider a network of sellers, each selling a single product, where the graph structure represents pair-wise complementarities between products. We study how the network structure affects revenue and social welfare of equilibria of the pricing game between the sellers. We prove positive and negative results, both of "Price of Anarchy" and of "Price of Stability" type, for special families of graphs (paths, cycles) as well as more general ones (trees, graphs). We describe best-reply dynamics that converge to non-trivial equilibrium in several families of graphs, and we use these dynamics to prove the existence of approximately-efficient equilibria.
Original language | English |
---|---|
Title of host publication | 43rd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming, ICALP 2016 |
Editors | Yuval Rabani, Ioannis Chatzigiannakis, Davide Sangiorgi, Michael Mitzenmacher |
Publisher | Schloss Dagstuhl- Leibniz-Zentrum fur Informatik GmbH, Dagstuhl Publishing |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9783959770132 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 1 Aug 2016 |
Event | 43rd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming, ICALP 2016 - Rome, Italy Duration: 12 Jul 2016 → 15 Jul 2016 |
Publication series
Name | Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics, LIPIcs |
---|---|
Volume | 55 |
ISSN (Print) | 1868-8969 |
Conference
Conference | 43rd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming, ICALP 2016 |
---|---|
Country/Territory | Italy |
City | Rome |
Period | 12/07/16 → 15/07/16 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© Moshe Babaioff, Liad Blumrosen, and Noam Nisan.
Keywords
- Complements
- Game Theory
- Networks
- Price of Stability
- Pricing