Newcomb meets Gettier

Ittay Nissan-Rozen*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Scopus citations


I show that accepting Moss’s (Philos Rev 122:1–43, 2013) claim that features of a rational agent’s credence function can constitute knowledge, together with the claim (put forward by several philosophers) that a rational agent should only act on the basis of reasons that he knows, predicts and explains evidential decision theory’s failure to recommend the right choice for the Newcomb problem. The Newcomb problem can be seen, in light of Moss’s suggestion, as a manifestation of a Gettier case in the domain of choice. This serves as strong evidence for both Moss’s claim and the knowledge-based action approach.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)4799-4814
Number of pages16
Issue number12
StatePublished - 1 Dec 2017

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2016, Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht.


  • Evidential decision theory
  • Gettier cases
  • Probabilistic knowledge
  • The Newcomb problem


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