TY - JOUR
T1 - Non-cooperative bargaining in natural monopolies
AU - Winter, Eyal
PY - 1994/10
Y1 - 1994/10
N2 - The joint production of a single output from a single input by a group of potential users of a technology is usually analyzed in the literature using a “cooperative” approach. We provide an analysis for such economies by means of non-cooperative bargaining. Two bargaining models are analyzed, one based on demands the other on proposals. We show that the convexity of the production function implies that subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of these bargaining games are coalition stable, (i.e., core outcomes). In the case of the proposal model, the equilibrium outcomes yield even a full characterization of the core. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers C72, D21, D42.
AB - The joint production of a single output from a single input by a group of potential users of a technology is usually analyzed in the literature using a “cooperative” approach. We provide an analysis for such economies by means of non-cooperative bargaining. Two bargaining models are analyzed, one based on demands the other on proposals. We show that the convexity of the production function implies that subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of these bargaining games are coalition stable, (i.e., core outcomes). In the case of the proposal model, the equilibrium outcomes yield even a full characterization of the core. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers C72, D21, D42.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0001250031&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1006/jeth.1994.1062
DO - 10.1006/jeth.1994.1062
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AN - SCOPUS:0001250031
SN - 0022-0531
VL - 64
SP - 202
EP - 220
JO - Journal of Economic Theory
JF - Journal of Economic Theory
IS - 1
ER -