Non-malleable cryptography

Danny Dolev, Cynthia Dwork, Moni Naor

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

452 Scopus citations

Abstract

The notion of non-malleable cryptography, an extension of semantically secure cryptography, is defined. Informally, the additional requirement is that given the ciphertext it is impossible to generate a diflerent ciphertext so that the respective plaintexts are related. The same concept makes sense in the contexts of string commitment and zero-knowledge proofs of possession of knowledge. Non-malleable schemes for each of these three problems are presented. The schemes do not assume a trusted center; a user need not know anything about the number or identity of other system users. The results can be applied to contract bidding, even when the nonfaulty bidders are unaware of the existence of the faulty bidders, and the problem of a "transparent intermediary" in a zero-knowledge proof of possession of knowledge is solved.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 23rd Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 1991
PublisherAssociation for Computing Machinery
Pages542-552
Number of pages11
ISBN (Electronic)0897913973
DOIs
StatePublished - 3 Jan 1991
Externally publishedYes
Event23rd Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 1991 - New Orleans, United States
Duration: 5 May 19918 May 1991

Publication series

NameProceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing
VolumePart F130073
ISSN (Print)0737-8017

Conference

Conference23rd Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 1991
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityNew Orleans
Period5/05/918/05/91

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 1991 ACM.

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