Abstract
The notion of non-malleable cryptography, an extension of semantically secure cryptography, is defined. Informally, the additional requirement is that given the ciphertext it is impossible to generate a diflerent ciphertext so that the respective plaintexts are related. The same concept makes sense in the contexts of string commitment and zero-knowledge proofs of possession of knowledge. Non-malleable schemes for each of these three problems are presented. The schemes do not assume a trusted center; a user need not know anything about the number or identity of other system users. The results can be applied to contract bidding, even when the nonfaulty bidders are unaware of the existence of the faulty bidders, and the problem of a "transparent intermediary" in a zero-knowledge proof of possession of knowledge is solved.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Proceedings of the 23rd Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 1991 |
Publisher | Association for Computing Machinery |
Pages | 542-552 |
Number of pages | 11 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 0897913973 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 3 Jan 1991 |
Externally published | Yes |
Event | 23rd Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 1991 - New Orleans, United States Duration: 5 May 1991 → 8 May 1991 |
Publication series
Name | Proceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing |
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Volume | Part F130073 |
ISSN (Print) | 0737-8017 |
Conference
Conference | 23rd Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 1991 |
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Country/Territory | United States |
City | New Orleans |
Period | 5/05/91 → 8/05/91 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 1991 ACM.