TY - JOUR
T1 - Not only what but also when
T2 - A theory of dynamic voluntary disclosure
AU - Guttman, Ilan
AU - Kremer, Ilan
AU - Skrzypacz, Andrzej
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2014 by the American Economic Association.
PY - 2014/8/1
Y1 - 2014/8/1
N2 - We examine a dynamic model of voluntary disclosure of multiple pieces of private information. In our model, a manager of a firm who may learn multiple signals over time interacts with a competitive capital market and maximizes payoffs that increase in both period prices. We show (perhaps surprisingly) that in equilibrium later disclosures are interpreted more favorably even though the time the manager obtains the signals is independent of the value of the firm. We also provide sufficient conditions for the equilibrium to be in threshold strategies.
AB - We examine a dynamic model of voluntary disclosure of multiple pieces of private information. In our model, a manager of a firm who may learn multiple signals over time interacts with a competitive capital market and maximizes payoffs that increase in both period prices. We show (perhaps surprisingly) that in equilibrium later disclosures are interpreted more favorably even though the time the manager obtains the signals is independent of the value of the firm. We also provide sufficient conditions for the equilibrium to be in threshold strategies.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84906999540&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1257/aer.104.8.2400
DO - 10.1257/aer.104.8.2400
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AN - SCOPUS:84906999540
SN - 0002-8282
VL - 104
SP - 2400
EP - 2420
JO - American Economic Review
JF - American Economic Review
IS - 8
ER -