On the computational power of iterative auctions

Liad Blumrosen; Noam Nisan

doi:10.1145/1064009.1064013

On the computational power of iterative auctions

Liad Blumrosen^*, Noam Nisan

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to conference › Paper › peer-review

28 Scopus citations

Abstract

We embark on a systematic analysis of the power and limitations of iterative combinatorial auctions. Most existing iterative combinatorial auctions are based on repeatedly suggesting prices for bundles of items, and querying the bidders for their "demand" under these prices. We prove a large number of results showing the boundaries of what can be achieved by auctions of this kind. We first focus on auctions that use a polynomial number of demand queries, and then we analyze the power of different kinds of ascending-price auctions.

Original language	English
Pages	29-43
Number of pages	15
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1145/1064009.1064013
State	Published - 2005
Event	EC'05: 6th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce - Vancouver, Canada Duration: 5 Jun 2005 → 8 Jun 2005

Conference

Conference	EC'05: 6th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Country/Territory	Canada
City	Vancouver
Period	5/06/05 → 8/06/05

Keywords

Ascending
Auctions
Combinatorial Auctions
Communication Complexity
Preference Elicitation

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10.1145/1064009.1064013

Cite this

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On the computational power of iterative auctions

Abstract

Conference

Keywords

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