On the computational power of iterative auctions

Liad Blumrosen*, Noam Nisan

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaperpeer-review

26 Scopus citations

Abstract

We embark on a systematic analysis of the power and limitations of iterative combinatorial auctions. Most existing iterative combinatorial auctions are based on repeatedly suggesting prices for bundles of items, and querying the bidders for their "demand" under these prices. We prove a large number of results showing the boundaries of what can be achieved by auctions of this kind. We first focus on auctions that use a polynomial number of demand queries, and then we analyze the power of different kinds of ascending-price auctions.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages29-43
Number of pages15
DOIs
StatePublished - 2005
EventEC'05: 6th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce - Vancouver, Canada
Duration: 5 Jun 20058 Jun 2005

Conference

ConferenceEC'05: 6th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Country/TerritoryCanada
CityVancouver
Period5/06/058/06/05

Keywords

  • Ascending
  • Auctions
  • Combinatorial Auctions
  • Communication Complexity
  • Preference Elicitation

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