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On the computational power of iterative auctions

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

32 Scopus citations

Abstract

We embark on a systematic analysis of the power and limitations of iterative combinatorial auctions. Most existing iterative combinatorial auctions are based on repeatedly suggesting prices for bundles of items, and querying the bidders for their "demand" under these prices. We prove a large number of results showing the boundaries of what can be achieved by auctions of this kind. We first focus on auctions that use a polynomial number of demand queries, and then we analyze the power of different kinds of ascending-price auctions.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationEC'05
Subtitle of host publicationProceedings of the 6th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
PublisherAssociation for Computing Machinery (ACM)
Pages29-43
Number of pages15
ISBN (Electronic)1595930493
DOIs
StatePublished - 5 Jun 2005
Event6th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, EC 2005 - Vancouver, Canada
Duration: 5 Jun 20058 Jun 2005

Publication series

NameProceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Conference

Conference6th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, EC 2005
Country/TerritoryCanada
CityVancouver
Period5/06/058/06/05

Keywords

  • Ascending
  • Auctions
  • Combinatorial Auctions
  • Communication Complexity
  • Preference Elicitation

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