On the structure of weakly acyclic games

Alex Fabrikant*, Aaron D. Jaggard, Michael Schapira

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

18 Scopus citations


The class of weakly acyclic games, which includes potential games and dominance-solvable games, captures many practical application domains. Informally, a weakly acyclic game is one where natural distributed dynamics, such as better-response dynamics, cannot enter inescapable oscillations. We establish a novel link between such games and the existence of pure Nash equilibria in subgames. Specifically, we show that the existence of a unique pure Nash equilibrium in every subgame implies the weak acyclicity of a game. In contrast, the possible existence of multiple pure Nash equilibria in every subgame is insufficient for weak acyclicity.

Original languageAmerican English
Title of host publicationAlgorithmic Game Theory - Third International Symposium, SAGT 2010, Proceedings
Number of pages12
StatePublished - 2010
Externally publishedYes
Event3rd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2010 - Athens, Greece
Duration: 18 Oct 201020 Oct 2010

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume6386 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349


Conference3rd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2010


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