On the voluntary disclosure of redundant information

Snehal Banerjee, Bradyn Breon-Drish*, Ron Kaniel, Ilan Kremer

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


Why do firms engage in costly, voluntary disclosure of information which is subsumed by a later announcement? We consider a model in which the firm's manager can choose to disclose short-term information which becomes redundant later. When disclosure costs are sufficiently low, the manager discloses even if she only cares about the long-term price of the firm. Intuitively, by disclosing, she causes early investors to trade less aggressively, reducing price informativeness, which in turn increases information acquisition by late investors. The subsequent increase in acquisition more than offsets the initial decrease in price informativeness and, consequently, improves long term prices.

Original languageAmerican English
Article number105743
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
StatePublished - Dec 2023

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2023 The Author(s)


  • Costly voluntary disclosure
  • Information acquisition
  • Redundant information


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