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Online ascending auctions for gradually expiring items
Ron Lavi
*
,
Noam Nisan
*
Corresponding author for this work
The Rachel and Selim Benin School of Engineering and Computer Science
Research output
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Contribution to journal
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Article
›
peer-review
11
Scopus citations
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Dive into the research topics of 'Online ascending auctions for gradually expiring items'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.
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Keyphrases
Social Welfare
100%
Ascending Auctions
100%
Nash Equilibrium
66%
Best Response Strategy
66%
Dynamic Nature
33%
Buyers
33%
Game Analysis
33%
Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatibility
33%
Multiple Items
33%
Auction Mechanism
33%
Allocation Rules
33%
Dynamic Auctions
33%
Expiration Time
33%
Design Mechanism
33%
Algorithm Rules
33%
Myopic Algorithm
33%
Myopic Strategy
33%
Mathematics
Nash Equilibrium
100%
Incentive compatibility
50%
Wide Class
50%
Dominant Strategy
50%
Computer Science
Nash Equilibrium
100%
Mechanism Design
50%
Dominant Strategy
50%
Dynamic Nature
50%
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Auction
100%
Social Welfare
50%
Nash Equilibrium
33%
Incentives
16%
Mechanism Design
16%