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Online ascending auctions for gradually expiring items
Ron Lavi
*
,
Noam Nisan
*
Corresponding author for this work
The Rachel and Selim Benin School of Engineering and Computer Science
Research output
:
Contribution to conference
›
Paper
›
peer-review
56
Scopus citations
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Dive into the research topics of 'Online ascending auctions for gradually expiring items'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.
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Keyphrases
Nash Equilibrium
100%
Best Response Strategy
100%
Ascending Auctions
100%
Dominant Strategy
50%
Social Welfare
50%
Game Analysis
50%
Under-report
50%
Truthful Auction
50%
Time of Arrival
50%
Online Auctions
50%
Myopic Behavior
50%
Expiration Time
50%
Myopic Algorithm
50%
Myopic Strategy
50%
Deadline Time
50%
Mathematics
Nash Equilibrium
100%
Concludes
50%
Wide Class
50%
Dominant Strategy
50%
Arrival Time
50%
Computer Science
Approximation (Algorithm)
100%
Nash Equilibrium
66%
Dominant Strategy
33%
Online Auctions
33%
Myopic Behavior
33%
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Auction
100%
Nash Equilibrium
28%
Social Welfare
14%
Online Auction
14%