Online Random Sampling for Budgeted Settings

Alon Eden*, Michal Feldman, Adi Vardi

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Scopus citations


We study online multi-unit auctions in which each agent’s private type consists of the agent’s arrival and departure times, valuation function and budget. Similarly to secretary settings, the different attributes of the agents’ types are determined by an adversary, but the arrival process is random. We establish a general framework for devising truthful random sampling mechanisms for online multi-unit settings with budgeted agents. We demonstrate the applicability of our framework by applying it to different objective functions (revenue and liquid welfare), and a range of assumptions about the agents’ valuations (additive or general) when selling identical divisible items. Our main result is the design of mechanisms for additive bidders with budget constraints that extract a constant fraction of the optimal revenue (under a standard large market assumption). We also show a mechanism that extracts a constant fraction of the optimal liquid welfare for general valuations.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)1470-1498
Number of pages29
JournalTheory of Computing Systems
Issue number7
StatePublished - 15 Oct 2019
Externally publishedYes

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2019, Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature.


  • Budgets
  • Liquid welfare
  • Mechanism design
  • Online mechanism
  • Revenue maximization


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