Optimal auctions and information disclosure

Alex Gershkov

doi:10.1007/s10058-009-0084-9

Optimal auctions and information disclosure

Alex Gershkov^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

12 Scopus citations

Abstract

We characterise properties of optimal auctions if the seller may disclose information about the quality of the object for sale. We show that the seller maximizes his expected revenue by revelation of all information to all bidders and implementing a second price auction with appropriate reservation price.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	335-344
Number of pages	10
Journal	Review of Economic Design
Volume	13
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-009-0084-9
State	Published - Nov 2009
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Information structures
Optimal auctions

Access to Document

10.1007/s10058-009-0084-9

Cite this

@article{170cc985e5254a099a115e211937f094,

title = "Optimal auctions and information disclosure",

abstract = "We characterise properties of optimal auctions if the seller may disclose information about the quality of the object for sale. We show that the seller maximizes his expected revenue by revelation of all information to all bidders and implementing a second price auction with appropriate reservation price.",

keywords = "Information structures, Optimal auctions",

author = "Alex Gershkov",

year = "2009",

month = nov,

doi = "10.1007/s10058-009-0084-9",

language = "אנגלית",

volume = "13",

pages = "335--344",

journal = "Review of Economic Design",

issn = "1434-4742",

publisher = "Springer Verlag",

number = "4",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Optimal auctions and information disclosure

AU - Gershkov, Alex

PY - 2009/11

Y1 - 2009/11

N2 - We characterise properties of optimal auctions if the seller may disclose information about the quality of the object for sale. We show that the seller maximizes his expected revenue by revelation of all information to all bidders and implementing a second price auction with appropriate reservation price.

AB - We characterise properties of optimal auctions if the seller may disclose information about the quality of the object for sale. We show that the seller maximizes his expected revenue by revelation of all information to all bidders and implementing a second price auction with appropriate reservation price.

KW - Information structures

KW - Optimal auctions

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=77949264347&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/s10058-009-0084-9

DO - 10.1007/s10058-009-0084-9

M3 - ???researchoutput.researchoutputtypes.contributiontojournal.article???

AN - SCOPUS:77949264347

SN - 1434-4742

VL - 13

SP - 335

EP - 344

JO - Review of Economic Design

JF - Review of Economic Design

IS - 4

ER -

Optimal auctions and information disclosure

Abstract

Keywords

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this