Optimal auctions and information disclosure

Alex Gershkov*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

12 Scopus citations

Abstract

We characterise properties of optimal auctions if the seller may disclose information about the quality of the object for sale. We show that the seller maximizes his expected revenue by revelation of all information to all bidders and implementing a second price auction with appropriate reservation price.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)335-344
Number of pages10
JournalReview of Economic Design
Volume13
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 2009
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Information structures
  • Optimal auctions

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