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Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition
Alex Gershkov
, Balázs Szentes
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Corresponding author for this work
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Article
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peer-review
70
Scopus citations
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Keyphrases
Efficient Mechanism
100%
Voting System
100%
Costly Information Acquisition
100%
Information Acquisition
50%
Social Welfare
50%
Acquiring Information
50%
Ex-post Efficiency
50%
Information Costs
50%
Decision-dependent Uncertainty
50%
Other-report
50%
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Social Welfare
100%
Decision under Uncertainty
100%