Organizational reputation, the content of public allegations, and regulatory communication

Sharon Gilad*, Moshe Maor, Pazit Ben Nun Bloom

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

113 Scopus citations

Abstract

How does the content of public allegations impact regulatory communication strategies? Employing a multinomial logistic regression analysis and an original data set, this article analyzes the Israeli banking regulator's nuanced responses to public expressions of opinion between 1996 and 2012. We demonstrate this agency's greater propensity to acknowledge problems, yet mostly shift blame to others when faced with claims that regulation is overly lenient, and to deny allegations that regulation is excessive. These findings, although based on one institution, are important because they demonstrate an agency's differential response to external allegations, given their content and its assessment of the relative threat to its reputation. They also suggest that external audiences may be able to shape agency attention and response by carefully framing their claims in light of their understandings of agencies' distinct reputational vulnerabilities.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)451-478
Number of pages28
JournalJournal of Public Administration Research and Theory
Volume25
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Apr 2015

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2013 © The Author 2013. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Inc. All rights reserved.

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