Parfit on the non-identity problem, again

David Heyd*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

12 Scopus citations

Abstract

In his recent work, Parfit returns to the examination of the non-identity problem, but this time not in the context of a theory of value but as part of a Scanlonian theory of reasons for action. His project is to find a middle ground between pure impersonalism and the narrow person-affecting view so as to do justice to some of our fundamental intuitions regarding procreative choices. The aim of this article is to show that despite the sophisticated and challenging thought experiments and conceptual suggestions (mainly that of a "general person"), Parfit's project fails and that we are left with the stark choice between personalism and impersonalism.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-20
Number of pages20
JournalLaw and Ethics of Human Rights
Volume8
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 May 2014

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2014 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin / Boston.

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