Abstract
In his recent work, Parfit returns to the examination of the non-identity problem, but this time not in the context of a theory of value but as part of a Scanlonian theory of reasons for action. His project is to find a middle ground between pure impersonalism and the narrow person-affecting view so as to do justice to some of our fundamental intuitions regarding procreative choices. The aim of this article is to show that despite the sophisticated and challenging thought experiments and conceptual suggestions (mainly that of a "general person"), Parfit's project fails and that we are left with the stark choice between personalism and impersonalism.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 1-20 |
Number of pages | 20 |
Journal | Law and Ethics of Human Rights |
Volume | 8 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 1 May 2014 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2014 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin / Boston.