Patriotism and morality: Mapping the terrain

Igor Primoratz*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

22 Scopus citations

Abstract

I first distinguish patriotism from nationalism. The kind of patriotism that provides the last refuge to the scoundrel is put aside as not to the point. I then develop a typology of positions on the moral standing of patriotism that includes (1) extreme patriotism that trumps moral considerations that conflict with it, (2) extreme patriotism understood as the central moral virtue, (3) moderate patriotism, (4) patriotism as a morally indifferent preference, and (5) a distinctively ethical version of patriotism. I argue that (1) is clearly morally unacceptable; concur with the critics of (2) that it, too, must be rejected; agree with the defenders of (3) that it is a distinctive and morally legitimate position, but go on to argue that there is nothing to be said for it, morally speaking, and that it is therefore (4) a morally indifferent preference; finally, I present (5) as a different type of patriotism which, under some fairly common circumstances, may be a moral duty.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)204-226
Number of pages23
JournalJournal of Moral Philosophy
Volume5
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - 2008
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Collective responsibility
  • Communitarianism
  • Liberalism
  • Patriotism
  • Special obligations

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