TY - JOUR
T1 - Perfect sequential equilibrium
AU - Grossman, Sanford J.
AU - Perry, Motty
PY - 1986/6
Y1 - 1986/6
N2 - Our equilibrium concept is a restriction of sequential equilibrium. A player chooses a "metastrategy" which specifies his act as a function of his belief. This permits players to evaluate how a game will evolve if new beliefs are assigned to a given node, and enables us to develop a restriction on the beliefs "off the equilibrium path." A perfect sequential equilibrium is supported by beliefs p which prevent a player from deviating to an unreached node, when there is no belief q which, when assigned to the node, makes it optimal for a deviation to occur with probability q.
AB - Our equilibrium concept is a restriction of sequential equilibrium. A player chooses a "metastrategy" which specifies his act as a function of his belief. This permits players to evaluate how a game will evolve if new beliefs are assigned to a given node, and enables us to develop a restriction on the beliefs "off the equilibrium path." A perfect sequential equilibrium is supported by beliefs p which prevent a player from deviating to an unreached node, when there is no belief q which, when assigned to the node, makes it optimal for a deviation to occur with probability q.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=38249038972&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/0022-0531(86)90022-0
DO - 10.1016/0022-0531(86)90022-0
M3 - ???researchoutput.researchoutputtypes.contributiontojournal.article???
AN - SCOPUS:38249038972
SN - 0022-0531
VL - 39
SP - 97
EP - 119
JO - Journal of Economic Theory
JF - Journal of Economic Theory
IS - 1
ER -