Perfect sequential equilibrium

Sanford J. Grossman; Motty Perry

doi:10.1016/0022-0531(86)90022-0

Perfect sequential equilibrium

Sanford J. Grossman^*
, Motty Perry

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

211 Scopus citations

Abstract

Our equilibrium concept is a restriction of sequential equilibrium. A player chooses a "metastrategy" which specifies his act as a function of his belief. This permits players to evaluate how a game will evolve if new beliefs are assigned to a given node, and enables us to develop a restriction on the beliefs "off the equilibrium path." A perfect sequential equilibrium is supported by beliefs p which prevent a player from deviating to an unreached node, when there is no belief q which, when assigned to the node, makes it optimal for a deviation to occur with probability q.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	97-119
Number of pages	23
Journal	Journal of Economic Theory
Volume	39
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(86)90022-0
State	Published - Jun 1986
Externally published	Yes

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10.1016/0022-0531(86)90022-0

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AB - Our equilibrium concept is a restriction of sequential equilibrium. A player chooses a "metastrategy" which specifies his act as a function of his belief. This permits players to evaluate how a game will evolve if new beliefs are assigned to a given node, and enables us to develop a restriction on the beliefs "off the equilibrium path." A perfect sequential equilibrium is supported by beliefs p which prevent a player from deviating to an unreached node, when there is no belief q which, when assigned to the node, makes it optimal for a deviation to occur with probability q.

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Perfect sequential equilibrium

Abstract

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