Performance Monitoring and the Incentives for Exertion of Effort

Yevgeny Mugerman*, Eyal Winter, Tomer Yafeh

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

This paper investigates the impact of monitoring intensity on individuals' motivation to exert effort. Using an experimental approach, we designed a test comprising six problems, with varied levels of monitoring and success criteria, to evaluate performance as an indicator of effort. The results reveal a nonlinear relationship between the stringency of monitoring criteria and worker performance. Interestingly, we found that optimal performance is attained when participants are required to answer correctly only one of the six problems. This study enhances our understanding of performance monitoring strategies and their effects in modern work settings.

Original languageAmerican English
Article number2440005
JournalQuarterly Journal of Finance
DOIs
StateAccepted/In press - 2024

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© World Scientific Publishing Company and Midwest Finance Association.

Keywords

  • employee motivation
  • experimental economics
  • incentive structures
  • Performance monitoring
  • success criteria in performance tests

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