Playing on a level field: Sincere and sophisticated players in the Boston mechanism with a coarse priority structure

Moshe Babaioff, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Assaf Romm

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

1 Scopus citations
Original languageAmerican English
Title of host publicationACM EC 2019 - Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
PublisherAssociation for Computing Machinery, Inc
Pages345
Number of pages1
ISBN (Electronic)9781450367929
DOIs
StatePublished - 17 Jun 2019
Event20th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC 2019 - Phoenix, United States
Duration: 24 Jun 201928 Jun 2019

Publication series

NameACM EC 2019 - Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

Conference

Conference20th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC 2019
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityPhoenix
Period24/06/1928/06/19

Keywords

  • Boston mechanism
  • Market design
  • School choice
  • Sincere and sophisticated players

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