Pooling Risk Games

Tzvi Alon; Moshe Haviv

doi:10.1142/S0219198919500154

Pooling Risk Games

Tzvi Alon^*, Moshe Haviv

^*Corresponding author for this work

Department of Statistics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

There are numerous situations in which variability reduction is desirable. We examine cases where such reductions can be achieved by cooperating agents who share similar interests. Our goal is to quantify the contribution of each of the agents toward this reduction. We model this situation as a cooperative game in which the cost is defined as the minimal standard deviation the cooperating agents can achieve. We show that this game is subadditive and has a nonempty core. We derive special presentations for the Shapley and Banzhaf values.

Original language	English
Article number	1950015
Journal	International Game Theory Review
Volume	22
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219198919500154
State	Published - 1 Sep 2020

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2020 World Scientific Publishing Company.

Keywords

Cooperative game theory
pooling risk
risk measure

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10.1142/S0219198919500154

Cite this

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Pooling Risk Games

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Keywords

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