Skip to main navigation Skip to search Skip to main content

Popper’s Criterion of Refutability in the Legal Context: Theory of Legal Science

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

In this paper we compare two criteria; Popper’s criterion of the refutability of scientific hypotheses and an analogous criterion, found in Talmudic law, for the admissibility of legal testimony. Popper’s criterion and the methodology based on it faces philosophical as well as pragmatic difficulties. We survey the major objections to Popper’s criterion and argue that they do not apply in the legal context. The paper is both a result and an illustration of the interaction between philosophy of science and philosophy of law.b
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationTheory of Legal Science
Subtitle of host publicationProceedings of the Conference on Legal Theory and Philosopy of Science Lund, Sweden, December 11–14, 1983
EditorsAleksander Peczenik, Lars Lindahl, Bert van Roermund
Place of PublicationDordrecht
PublisherSpringer Netherlands
Pages425-435.
Number of pages11
ISBN (Electronic)9789400964815
ISBN (Print)9789400964839
DOIs
StatePublished - 1984

Publication series

NameSynthese Library
Volume176

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Popper’s Criterion of Refutability in the Legal Context: Theory of Legal Science'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this