TY - JOUR
T1 - Positive second-best theory
T2 - A brief survey of the theory of ramsey pricing
AU - Hagen, Kare P.
AU - Sheshinski, Eytan
PY - 1986/1/1
Y1 - 1986/1/1
N2 - This chapter surveys issues in positive second-best theory, specifically the theory of the optimal pricing of goods produced by public firms—that is, firms whose objective is the maximization of social welfare. It is assumed that these firms, characteristically, display increasing returns to scale. In these situations, first-best optima may require lump-sum taxes and subsidies. In view of the size of the public sector in most industrialized countries, it is difficult to imagine that public activities can be financed without distortionary effects elsewhere in the economy. The chapter assumes perfect possibilities for lump-sum income transfers to focus on the efficiency aspect of optimal pricing. If lump-sum redistribution is impossible, deviations from marginal costs for prices under public control may be motivated by distributional considerations—that is, the government may want to use its excise tax power to improve the income distribution. The chapter provides general formulation that forms a basis for special cases that are analyzed in more detail subsequently. It also discusses the joint decision for the optimal supply of public goods and the pricing problem. Finally, it analyzes some issues in predation and Ramsey pricing in a dynamic context.
AB - This chapter surveys issues in positive second-best theory, specifically the theory of the optimal pricing of goods produced by public firms—that is, firms whose objective is the maximization of social welfare. It is assumed that these firms, characteristically, display increasing returns to scale. In these situations, first-best optima may require lump-sum taxes and subsidies. In view of the size of the public sector in most industrialized countries, it is difficult to imagine that public activities can be financed without distortionary effects elsewhere in the economy. The chapter assumes perfect possibilities for lump-sum income transfers to focus on the efficiency aspect of optimal pricing. If lump-sum redistribution is impossible, deviations from marginal costs for prices under public control may be motivated by distributional considerations—that is, the government may want to use its excise tax power to improve the income distribution. The chapter provides general formulation that forms a basis for special cases that are analyzed in more detail subsequently. It also discusses the joint decision for the optimal supply of public goods and the pricing problem. Finally, it analyzes some issues in predation and Ramsey pricing in a dynamic context.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=4043141772&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/S1573-4382(86)03007-2
DO - 10.1016/S1573-4382(86)03007-2
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AN - SCOPUS:4043141772
SN - 1573-4382
VL - 3
SP - 1251
EP - 1280
JO - Handbook of Mathematical Economics
JF - Handbook of Mathematical Economics
IS - C
ER -