Power and public goods

R. J. Aumann; M. Kurz; A. Neyman

doi:10.1016/0022-0531(87)90105-0

Power and public goods

R. J. Aumann^*, M. Kurz, A. Neyman

^*Corresponding author for this work

Einstein Institute of Mathematics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

9 Scopus citations

Abstract

A game-theoretic analysis using the Harsanyi-Shapley nontransferable utility value indicates that the choice of public goods in a democracy is not affected by who has voting rights. This is corroborated by an independent economic argument based on the implicit price of a vote.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	108-127
Number of pages	20
Journal	Journal of Economic Theory
Volume	42
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(87)90105-0
State	Published - Jun 1987

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Power and public goods

Abstract

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