Skip to main navigation Skip to search Skip to main content

Practical secrecy-preserving, verifiably correct and trustworthy auctions

  • David C. Parkes*
  • , Michael O. Rabin
  • , Stuart M. Shieber
  • , Christopher Thorpe
  • *Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

48 Scopus citations

Abstract

We present a practical protocol based on homomorphic cryptography for conducting provably fair sealed-bid auctions. The system preserves the secrecy of the bids, even after the announcement of auction results, while also providing for public verifiability of the correctness and trustworthiness of the outcome. No party, including the auctioneer, receives any information about bids before the auction closes, and no bidder is able to change or repudiate any bid. The system is illustrated through application to first-price, uniform-price and second-price auctions, including multi-item auctions. Empirical results based on an analysis of a prototype demonstrate the practicality of our protocol for real-world applications.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)294-312
Number of pages19
JournalElectronic Commerce Research and Applications
Volume7
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 2008
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Auction theory
  • Auctions
  • Cryptographic auctions
  • Cryptography
  • E-commerce
  • Electronic transactions
  • Homomorphic cryptography
  • Security

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Practical secrecy-preserving, verifiably correct and trustworthy auctions'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this