TY - GEN

T1 - Proof systems and transformation games

AU - Bachrach, Yoram

AU - Zuckerman, Michael

AU - Wooldridge, Michael

AU - Rosenschein, Jeffrey S.

PY - 2010

Y1 - 2010

N2 - We introduce Transformation Games (TGs), a form of coalitional game in which players are endowed with sets of initial resources, and have capabilities allowing them to derive certain output resources, given certain input resources. The aim of a TG is to generate a particular target resource; players achieve this by forming a coalition capable of performing a sequence of transformations from its combined set of initial resources to the target resource. After presenting the TG model, and discussing its interpretation, we consider possible restrictions on the transformation chain, resulting in different coalitional games. After presenting the basic model, we consider the computational complexity of several problems in TGs, such as testing whether a coalition wins, checking if a player is a dummy or a veto player, computing the core of the game, computing power indices, and checking the effects of possible restrictions on the coalition. Finally, we consider extensions to the model in which transformations have associated costs.

AB - We introduce Transformation Games (TGs), a form of coalitional game in which players are endowed with sets of initial resources, and have capabilities allowing them to derive certain output resources, given certain input resources. The aim of a TG is to generate a particular target resource; players achieve this by forming a coalition capable of performing a sequence of transformations from its combined set of initial resources to the target resource. After presenting the TG model, and discussing its interpretation, we consider possible restrictions on the transformation chain, resulting in different coalitional games. After presenting the basic model, we consider the computational complexity of several problems in TGs, such as testing whether a coalition wins, checking if a player is a dummy or a veto player, computing the core of the game, computing power indices, and checking the effects of possible restrictions on the coalition. Finally, we consider extensions to the model in which transformations have associated costs.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=78349273585&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/978-3-642-15155-2_9

DO - 10.1007/978-3-642-15155-2_9

M3 - Conference contribution

AN - SCOPUS:78349273585

SN - 364215154X

SN - 9783642151545

T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

SP - 78

EP - 89

BT - Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science 2010 - 35th International Symposium, MFCS 2010, Proceedings

T2 - 35th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science, MFCS 2010

Y2 - 23 August 2010 through 27 August 2010

ER -