Psychic Conflict and Intrinsic Value in the Gorgias

The Gorgias is often taken to contain two distinct psychological theories. In the course of the conversation with Polus Socrates seems to subscribe to an “intellectualistic” theory that takes all desire for action as a manifestation of the agent’s conception of the good. Yet during his conversation with Callicles Socrates acknowledges the existence of mental conflict and so seems to presuppose the existence of irrational, i.e. non-good-oriented, desires. In what follows I offer a new way of unifying the two sections. I argue that Socrates’ later acknowledgment of possible conflict between the agent’s desire for pleasure and her desire for an action she deems beneficial does not presuppose that the former is an irrational desire. In fact, Socrates’ conversation with Callicles forces us to take the desire for pleasure as a manifestation of the agent’s conception of the good. I argue that once the relevant notion of “the good” in play is properly understood, it becomes apparent that mental conflict is in principle compatible with a soul characterized solely by good-oriented desires. Yet it also becomes clear that such conflict can be fully avoided by acquiring the proper conception of the good.