TY - CHAP
T1 - Psychologism and meaning
AU - Ben-Menahem, Yemima
N1 - Published as an ebook in 2002?
PY - 1998
Y1 - 1998
N2 - Words convey meaning and information. Words also affect us in various ways: they comfort or offend, make us blush, laugh and cry, make us happy or sad. How are these effects related to the meanings of the words? In some cases a simple answer suggests itself. It could be held, for example, that the words “I love you” convey to the addressee that he or she is loved, and since being loved is a basic need, the satisfaction of which typically brings happiness, they make the loved one happy. The merit of the simple answer is that it keeps the meaning of the words (the expression of love) at a safe distance from the causal effects these words may have (making the beloved happy). In this respect this answer seems to be in harmony with a long tradition that sharply distinguishes causal connections from connections in language, and strives to cleanse the theory of meaning of any trace of psychologism. The simple answer, however, is not always fully satisfactory, for at times we may need to refer to the effect of what is said to elucidate its meaning; we may need to find out what certain words do to us to decide what they mean. Thus, listening to what someone tells me, I can grasp an implicit intention to flatter or offend, and use this clue to interpret what has been said differently than I would have otherwise. In such cases it is hard to say whether the offense or flattery is, in this particular context, part of the meaning of what is said or just its intended causal effect. But in so blurring the distinction between the meaning or content of speech, on the one hand, and its effects, on the other, we seem, prima facie at least, to be making concessions to a psychologistic conception of meaning. The question addressed in this chapter is whether this is indeed the case, that is, whether this sort of an effect-oriented examination of meaning is in fact guilty of psychologism. Rather than turning to it directly, however, I deal with it via examination of James’s and Wittgenstein’s conceptions of meaning. I begin by tracing the development of the notion of psychologism from Frege to Wittgenstein.
AB - Words convey meaning and information. Words also affect us in various ways: they comfort or offend, make us blush, laugh and cry, make us happy or sad. How are these effects related to the meanings of the words? In some cases a simple answer suggests itself. It could be held, for example, that the words “I love you” convey to the addressee that he or she is loved, and since being loved is a basic need, the satisfaction of which typically brings happiness, they make the loved one happy. The merit of the simple answer is that it keeps the meaning of the words (the expression of love) at a safe distance from the causal effects these words may have (making the beloved happy). In this respect this answer seems to be in harmony with a long tradition that sharply distinguishes causal connections from connections in language, and strives to cleanse the theory of meaning of any trace of psychologism. The simple answer, however, is not always fully satisfactory, for at times we may need to refer to the effect of what is said to elucidate its meaning; we may need to find out what certain words do to us to decide what they mean. Thus, listening to what someone tells me, I can grasp an implicit intention to flatter or offend, and use this clue to interpret what has been said differently than I would have otherwise. In such cases it is hard to say whether the offense or flattery is, in this particular context, part of the meaning of what is said or just its intended causal effect. But in so blurring the distinction between the meaning or content of speech, on the one hand, and its effects, on the other, we seem, prima facie at least, to be making concessions to a psychologistic conception of meaning. The question addressed in this chapter is whether this is indeed the case, that is, whether this sort of an effect-oriented examination of meaning is in fact guilty of psychologism. Rather than turning to it directly, however, I deal with it via examination of James’s and Wittgenstein’s conceptions of meaning. I begin by tracing the development of the notion of psychologism from Frege to Wittgenstein.
U2 - 10.4324/9780203048573-12
DO - 10.4324/9780203048573-12
M3 - ???researchoutput.researchoutputtypes.contributiontobookanthology.chapter???
SN - 9780203048573
T3 - Routledge Studies in Twentieth-century Philosophy
SP - 123-140.
BT - The Story of Analytic Philosophy
A2 - Biletzki , Anat
A2 - Matar, Anat
PB - Routledge
ER -