Public-key cryptographic primitives provably as secure as subset sum

Vadim Lyubashevsky*, Adriana Palacio, Gil Segev

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

54 Scopus citations

Abstract

We propose a semantically-secure public-key encryption scheme whose security is polynomial-time equivalent to the hardness of solving random instances of the subset sum problem. The subset sum assumption required for the security of our scheme is weaker than that of existing subset-sum based encryption schemes, namely the lattice-based schemes of Ajtai and Dwork (STOC'97), Regev (STOC'03, STOC'05), and Peikert (STOC'09). Additionally, our proof of security is simple and direct. We also present a natural variant of our scheme that is secure against key-leakage attacks, and an oblivious transfer protocol that is secure against semi-honest adversaries.

Original languageAmerican English
Title of host publicationTheory of Cryptography - 7th Theory of Cryptography Conference, TCC 2010, Proceedings
Pages382-400
Number of pages19
DOIs
StatePublished - 2010
Externally publishedYes
Event7th Theory of Cryptography Conference, TCC 2010 - Zurich, Switzerland
Duration: 9 Feb 201011 Feb 2010

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume5978 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Conference

Conference7th Theory of Cryptography Conference, TCC 2010
Country/TerritorySwitzerland
CityZurich
Period9/02/1011/02/10

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