Public-key cryptographic primitives provably as secure as subset sum

Vadim Lyubashevsky; Adriana Palacio; Gil Segev

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-11799-2_23

Public-key cryptographic primitives provably as secure as subset sum

Vadim Lyubashevsky^*, Adriana Palacio, Gil Segev

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

58 Scopus citations

Abstract

We propose a semantically-secure public-key encryption scheme whose security is polynomial-time equivalent to the hardness of solving random instances of the subset sum problem. The subset sum assumption required for the security of our scheme is weaker than that of existing subset-sum based encryption schemes, namely the lattice-based schemes of Ajtai and Dwork (STOC'97), Regev (STOC'03, STOC'05), and Peikert (STOC'09). Additionally, our proof of security is simple and direct. We also present a natural variant of our scheme that is secure against key-leakage attacks, and an oblivious transfer protocol that is secure against semi-honest adversaries.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Theory of Cryptography - 7th Theory of Cryptography Conference, TCC 2010, Proceedings
Pages	382-400
Number of pages	19
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-11799-2_23
State	Published - 2010
Externally published	Yes
Event	7th Theory of Cryptography Conference, TCC 2010 - Zurich, Switzerland Duration: 9 Feb 2010 → 11 Feb 2010

Publication series

Name	Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume	5978 LNCS
ISSN (Print)	0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)	1611-3349

Conference

Conference	7th Theory of Cryptography Conference, TCC 2010
Country/Territory	Switzerland
City	Zurich
Period	9/02/10 → 11/02/10

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10.1007/978-3-642-11799-2_23

Cite this

Lyubashevsky, V., Palacio, A., & Segev, G. (2010). Public-key cryptographic primitives provably as secure as subset sum. In Theory of Cryptography - 7th Theory of Cryptography Conference, TCC 2010, Proceedings (pp. 382-400). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 5978 LNCS). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-11799-2_23

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abstract = "We propose a semantically-secure public-key encryption scheme whose security is polynomial-time equivalent to the hardness of solving random instances of the subset sum problem. The subset sum assumption required for the security of our scheme is weaker than that of existing subset-sum based encryption schemes, namely the lattice-based schemes of Ajtai and Dwork (STOC'97), Regev (STOC'03, STOC'05), and Peikert (STOC'09). Additionally, our proof of security is simple and direct. We also present a natural variant of our scheme that is secure against key-leakage attacks, and an oblivious transfer protocol that is secure against semi-honest adversaries.",

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Lyubashevsky, V, Palacio, A & Segev, G 2010, Public-key cryptographic primitives provably as secure as subset sum. in Theory of Cryptography - 7th Theory of Cryptography Conference, TCC 2010, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 5978 LNCS, pp. 382-400, 7th Theory of Cryptography Conference, TCC 2010, Zurich, Switzerland, 9/02/10. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-11799-2_23

Public-key cryptographic primitives provably as secure as subset sum. / Lyubashevsky, Vadim; Palacio, Adriana; Segev, Gil.
Theory of Cryptography - 7th Theory of Cryptography Conference, TCC 2010, Proceedings. 2010. p. 382-400 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 5978 LNCS).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

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Lyubashevsky V, Palacio A, Segev G. Public-key cryptographic primitives provably as secure as subset sum. In Theory of Cryptography - 7th Theory of Cryptography Conference, TCC 2010, Proceedings. 2010. p. 382-400. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)). doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-11799-2_23

Public-key cryptographic primitives provably as secure as subset sum

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